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Abstract
Neglected diseases are typically characterized as those for which adequate drug treatment is lacking, and the potential
return on effort in research and development (R&D), to produce new therapies, is too small for companies to invest
significant resources in the field. In recent years various incentives schemes to stimulate R&D by pharmaceutical firms have
been considered. Broadly speaking, these can be classified either as ‘push’ or ‘pull’ programs. Hybrid options, that include
push and pull incentives, have also become increasingly popular. Supporters and critics of these various incentive schemes
have argued in favor of their relative merits and limitations, although the view that no mechanism is a perfect fit for all
situations appears to be widely held. For this reason, the debate on the advantages and disadvantages of different
approaches has been important for policy decisions, but is dispersed in a variety of sources. With this in mind, the aim of
this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the economic determinants behind R&D investments for neglected
diseases by comparing the relative strength of different incentive schemes within a simple economic model, based on the
assumption of profit maximizing firms. The analysis suggests that co-funded push programs are generally more efficient
than pure pull programs. However, by setting appropriate intermediate goals hybrid incentive schemes could further
improve efficiency.
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Introduction
Neglected diseases are typically characterised as those for which
adequate drug treatment is lacking, because the potential return
on investment in research and development (R&D), needed to
produce new treatments, is too small to induce companies to
employ significant resources in the field. As a result a large number
of patients lack appropriate therapies, though many of such
diseases can cause death or very poor quality of life. Examples
include infectious diseases that predominantly affect the develop-
ing world, such as African trypanosomiasis and schistosomiasis, as
well as rare diseases affecting also people in the more developed
countries.
Mobilizing public and private institutions, researchers, and
pharmaceutical firms to engage in R&D for neglected diseases has
been the focus of considerable effort and funding in recent years.
In particular, multiple public–private partnerships (PPPs), such as
the Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical
Diseases (TDR), the Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV),
Drugs for Neglected Diseases (DNDi), and the Global Alliance for
TB Drug Development, have been founded to spur R&D and drug
delivery effort for infectious diseases. There have also been major
influxes of funding, for example, from the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation, as well as from national governments
[1],[2],[3],[4],[5],[6],[7].
Various incentive mechanisms have been associated with such
initiatives [8],[9],[10],[11],[12],[13] starting with the 1983 US
legislation on Orphan Drugs, later on also enacted by other
countries to fight rare diseases. Broadly speaking, these can be
classified either as ‘push’ or ‘pull’ programmes. Push programmes
have a direct impact on R&D expenditures, supporting drug
discovery, and often take the form of upfront research grants, from
public institutions or charities to pharmaceutical firms. On the
other hand, pull incentives stimulate research effort indirectly, by
enhancing the revenue potential and/or lowering delivery costs.
Examples include differential pricing, advanced market commit-
ments (AMC) and prize mechanism proposals, an important route
to implement the principle of ‘‘delinking’’ price from R&D costs,
recently advocated by the Consultative Expert Working Group
(CEWG) on R&D of the World Health Organization [14]. Hybrid
options that include push and pull incentives have also become
increasingly adopted in recent years, a notable example of which
are Orphan Drugs legislations.
Supporters and critics of these various incentive schemes have
argued in favour of their relative merits and limitations, although
the view that no mechanism is a perfect fit for all situations appears
to be widely held. For this reason, though the debate on the
advantages and disadvantages of different approaches has been
important for policy decisions, it is dispersed in a variety of sources
and not always easy to summarise. With this in mind, the aim of
this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the economic
determinants behind R&D investments for neglected diseases
through the presentation of economic models of various incentive
schemes. More specifically, the main goal of such models is to
provide a formal platform where comparison of different incentive
programs for R&D investments could be made within a unified
framework. Though most of the analysis will be based on the
standard assumption of profit maximising pharmaceutical com-
panies, in the supplementary material we shall also consider
alternative goals such as productivity maximisation, as well as
zero-profit R&D investment levels that may characterise non-
commercial institutions developing new drugs. As with every
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model our goal is not to provide explanations for each single, and
different, case but rather to gain insights on the main underlying
forces behind alternative incentive schemes. Indeed, as we shall
see, some of the results are not obvious. Though inspired by
neglected diseases, the analysis is more general and the main
findings can also apply to corporate R&D incentive schemes,
concerning any kind of treatment and disease. Finally, while the
main text shortly presents the fundamental insights of the work, a
detailed analysis is contained in the supporting information S1.
Results
R&D investment with no incentives
To illustrate the economic basis for decisions by companies
about levels of investment in R&D for neglected diseases, a simple
numerical example can be used, starting with the case of a profit
maximizing company with no external R&D incentives (see the
supporting information S1 for a more general analysis).
Consider a pharmaceutical company which, for simplicity and
no major loss of generality, can only undertake four levels of R&D
investments C (in billions $), that appear on the top row of Table 1.
Each such R&D level has a corresponding success probability
p(C), that reflects the assumption of decreasing returns on R&D
investment. For instance, if R&D investment is doubled then
success probability increases but less than twice the initial value. In
the supporting information S1 other assumptions concerning
returns from investments will also be considered.
Assuming that perspective profits (net revenues), that is revenues
minus production and delivery costs, from a successful investment
are low (for example R=0.3), and no additional external funds,
Table 1 shows the expected profit associated to the four R&D
levels (for details see the supporting information S1). Though a
very important issue with infectious and tropical diseases, it is not a
goal of this paper to discuss how drug delivery can be achieved and
at what costs. We simply assume that it could always be possible at
some costs, and incorporated in R. Finally, perspective revenues
may be low either because demand is potentially high but
individuals are poor and cannot pay for treatment, as in the case of
infectious diseases, or because the disease is rare and the number
of affected individuals low.
In this case no investment, C=0 is the best plan for the
company then, respectively, C=0.2 and C=0.4 with the highest
C=0.6 being the least preferred. As a consequence, the company
would not engage in R&D and the disease remains neglected.
Notice that this would be so even if the goal is to invest in R&D as
long as profits are non-negative.
Comparing R&D incentive schemes
Suppose now that an external sponsor wishes to support R&D
to find a treatment for the neglected disease, and has an available
budget of B=1.2. The sponsor may use the whole budget, or part
of it, to stimulate the firm R&D through a funding function made
of a fixed sum F, and a component f(C) related to C:F+f(C) (see the
supporting information S1 for more details).
If the aim of the funder is to maximize the probability of
discovery which, given the shape of the success probability
typically coincides with maximizing the total amount invested in
R&D, the problem for the sponsor is to choose how the money
should be transferred to the company. In what follows we model
the outcome of various options using push incentives, pull
incentives or push– pull hybrid strategies, with either variable or
constant funding from the sponsor.
Variable funding. With variable funding, the main findings
of the analysis are summarised by Table 2 (see the supporting
information S1 for more details).
In this model with profit maximisation and variable funding (in
the example F(C) =C), the expected profit columns in Table 2
indicate that both push and pull incentives induce the highest
possible level of R&D by the company, but that push schemes are
more efficient as they provide a larger expected payoff to the firm.
A point is noteworthy here. To induce the highest level of R&D,
the sponsor does not need to use the whole budget. Indeed, with
push incentives, the maximum level of R&D could have been
induced by spending less than C=0.6 (for more on this see the
supporting information S1).
Constant and hybrid funding. However, if the sponsor
finds it difficult to verify the R&D investment level, then a constant
funding function F(C) = F, independent of C, could be used. When
this is so, for the particular case in which F(C) =B= 1.2, Table 3
summarizes the outcomes (see the supporting information S for
further details).
In this case, the expected profit columns indicate that with
constant funding, push schemes do not have the strength to alter
the order of preference for R&D investment of the company in the
case of no incentives (Table 1), and so the chosen level would still
result in C=0. However, pull incentives instead are now capable
Table 1. The firm expected profit with no incentives.
C=0 C=0.2 C=0.4 C=0.6 Comment
Expected
Profit*
0 20.05 20.2 20.34 No incentive to
invest in R&D
*The expected profit term includes no funding by external sponsors. The net
revenue R from a successful product is 0.3. The probabilities of successful R&D
investment for the firm (C= 0, C= 0.2, C= 0.4 and C= 0.6) are, respectively, 0, 0.5,
0.66 and 0.85.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050835.t001
Table 2. Comparing push and pull mechanisms with variable funding F(C) = C.
Expected profit* Comment
Scheme C=0 C=0.2 C=0.4 C=0.6
Push 0 0.05 0.2 0.51 Optimal to choose the maximum R&D
level
Pull 0 0.05 0.07 0.16 Optimal to choose the maximum R&D
level
*The expected profit term includes the funding provided by the sponsor, whether or not it is actually spent on R&D by the firm. The net revenue R from a successful
product is 0.3. The probabilities of successful R&D investment for the firm (C= 0, C= 0.2, C= 0.4 and C= 0.6) are, respectively, 0, 0.5, 0.66 and 0.85.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050835.t002
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to reverse such order, inducing the company to choose sponta-
neously C=0.6.
In summary with profit maximisation and constant funding,
while firms in general would prefer push incentives, pull incentives
appear to be more powerful at stimulating R&D investment. So,
there could be a trade-off between enhancing the expected profit
of the company and increasing success probability. Mixed push–
pull incentive schemes, in which part of F(C) is given upfront but
the rest only upon successful drug discovery can mitigate such
tension. Indeed, as illustrated by Table 3, mixed schemes could
still induce C=0.6 while increasing the expected profit of the
company with respect to pull incentives; that is, mixed schemes
could be economically more efficient. This is because, with respect
to pull incentives, mixed schemes are better at sharing the risk of
financial losses between the company and the sponsor. For this
reason, whenever possible for the sponsor, an efficient way to
separate the budget in the two push–pull components is to first
identify the pull component sufficient to induce the desired R&D
investment and then allocate the remaining sum to the push
component.
This last observation suggests that incentive schemes in which
risk could be further shared may have the potential to improve
economic efficiency. Indeed, as shown in the expected profit
column of Table 3, a type of push–pull incentive mechanism
known as pay-as-you-go (PAYG), in which the available budget B
can be separated into more than two components to incorporate
intermediate, as well as final, goals set by the sponsor can achieve
so. This could explain their increasingly frequent adoption.
It is worth noticing that unlike Table 2, push incentives in
Table 3 would induce no R&D investment with expected profit
maximisation but maximum investment with the non-negative
profit goal.
Discussion
The models presented in this paper are built on two main
assumptions: first, that the level of investment made by the firm is
based on expected profits maximization [15] and, second, that the
probability of success increases with increasing levels of invest-
ment, but at decreasing rates. The possible limitations of such
assumptions are discussed at length in the supporting information.
Determining the shape of the relationship between investment
and the probability of success is also a key aspect for sponsors
aiming to apply the points illustrated by this analysis, because the
relative effectiveness of alternative incentive schemes is based on it.
An estimation making use of available data, based on a recent
study of the costs of the different phases for developing a new drug,
is presented in the supplementary material. This analysis confirms
that incentive schemes based on constant sums appear to be much
less effective at inducing R&D investment by business companies,
and/or more expensive for the sponsor, than simple linear
incentive functions such as F(C) = bC. Indeed, in general, incentive
programs can induce profit maximizing firms to invest in R&D if
the funding does not add up as a constant to the firm expected
profit.
Materials and Methods
The paper is based on the analysis of a stylized economic model.
So the only materials used are the data from Paul et al [16], in the
supporting information S1, while methods are just economic and
mathematical analysis.
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